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by solving optimal control problems, for their ability to dampen economic
ﬂuctuations caused by random shocks. A tax rate rule is also considered.
A multicountry econometric model is used for the experiments. The results
differ sharply from those obtained using recent models in which the coefﬁ-
cient on inﬂation in the nominal interest rate rule must be greater than one in
order for the economy to be stable.
1 Introduction
Many of the recent studies examining monetary policy effects have used macroe-
conomic models with a particular feature. In these models an increase in inﬂation
with the nominal interest rate held constant is expansionary, and the economy is
not stable unless the coefﬁcient on inﬂation in the nominal interest rate rule is
greater than one.1 Although these models, which will be called “modern-view”
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
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1These models are nicely summarized in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Taylor (2000), and
Romer (2000). They are used in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and in virtually all the papers in
Taylor (1999) to examine monetary policy rules.models, have been widely used, it is not clear that they have adequately captured
the effects of inﬂation shocks. The results in Fair (2002), which are based on a
structural macroeconometric model (discussed below), suggest that an increase in
inﬂation is contractionary even when the nominal interest rate is held constant.
Essentially the same results are reached in Giordani (2002) from analyzing VAR
models. The results from these two quite different approaches thus cast doubt on a
keypropertyofmodern-viewmodels. Theysuggestthatthecoefﬁcientoninﬂation
in the interest rate rule does not have to be greater than one for the economy to be
stable, which, as will be seen, has important consequences for monetary policy.
This paper uses the multicountry econometric (MC) model in Fair (1994) to
examine monetary policy effects. The MC model has been extensively tested, in-
cluding tests for rational expectations, and it appears to be a good approximation
of the economy. These tests are in Fair (1994) and on the website mentioned in
the introductory footnote. The MC model is brieﬂy outlined in the appendix. The
appendix includes an explanation of the property of the model that a positive inﬂa-
tion shock with the nominal interest rate held constant is contractionary, which, as
mentioned above, is a key difference from modern-view models. In the MC model
a positive inﬂation shock lowers real wage income (because wages lag prices) and
real wealth (because nominal wealth lags prices), both of which have a negative
effect on real consumer expenditures. In addition, the estimation results suggest
that households respond to nominal interest rates rather than real interest rates.
There is thus no estimated positive household response to lower real interest rates
when there is a positive inﬂation shock with nominal interest rates held constant.
2Section 2 examines the stabilization features of four interest rate rules for
the United States. The ﬁrst is the estimated rule in the MC model, which has
an estimated long run coefﬁcient on inﬂation of 1.0. The other three rules are
modiﬁcationsoftheestimatedrule, withimposedlongruncoefﬁcientsoninﬂation
of 0.0, 1.5, and 2.5 respectively. It will be seen that as the inﬂation coefﬁcient
increases there is a reduction in price variability at a cost of an increase in interest
rate variability. Even the rule with a zero inﬂation coefﬁcient is stabilizing, which
is contrary to what would be obtained using modern-view models, since in these
models the economy is not stable if the inﬂation coefﬁcient is less than one.
Section 3 then computes optimal rules for particular loss functions. These
solutions require a combination of stochastic simulation and solving deterministic
optimal control problems, and this is the ﬁrst time that such solutions have been
obtained for a large scale model. It will be seen that the optimal control results
are similar to those obtained using the estimated rule mentioned above for a loss
function with a much higher weight on inﬂation than on output.
Another feature of the results in Sections 2 and 3 is that considerable variance
of the endogenous variables is left using even the best interest rate rule. Section 4
then adds a ﬁscal policy rule—a tax rate rule—to see how much help it can be to
monetary policy in trying to stabilize the economy. The results show that the tax
rate rule provides some help. This is also the ﬁrst time that such a rule has been
analyzed using a large scale model.
32 Stabilization Effectiveness of Four Nominal
Interest Rate Rules
The Estimated U.S. Rule and Three Modiﬁcations
There is an estimated nominal interest rate rule for each of the major countries in
the MC model. The estimated rule for the United States is one of the rules used
in this paper, and the following is a brief discussion of the rule. Estimated U.S.
interest rate rules have a long history. The ﬁrst one is in Dewald and Johnson
(1963), who regressed the Treasury bill rate on a constant, the Treasury bill rate
lagged once, real GNP, the unemployment rate, the balance-of-payments deﬁcit,
and the consumer price index. The next example can be found in Christian (1968),
followed by many others. In 1978, I added an estimated interest rate rule to my
U.S. model—Fair (1978)—and an updated version of this rule is the one used in
this paper.
The main modiﬁcation that has been made to the 1978 rule is the addition of a
dummy variable term to account for the change in Fed operating procedure during
the period 1979:4–1982:3 (to be called the “early Volcker” period).2 The stated
policy of the Fed during this period was that it was focusing more on monetary
aggregates than it had done in the past. The estimated interest rate rule already had
the lagged growth of the money supply as an explanatory variable, and the change
inpolicywasmodeledbyaddingthelaggedgrowthofthemoneysupplymultiplied
by a dummy variable as another explanatory variable. The dummy variable is 1
2Paul Volcker was chair of the Fed between 1979:3 and 1987:2, but the period in question is
only 1979:4–1982:3.
4for the 1979:4–1982:3 period and 0 otherwise.
The exact speciﬁcation of the rule that is used in this paper is:
r = α1 + α2 ˙ p + α3u + α4 u + α5 ˙ m−1 + α6D1 ×˙ m−1
+α7r−1 + α8 r−1 + α9 r−2 +  
(1)
where r is the three month Treasury bill rate, ˙ p is the quarterly rate of inﬂation
at an annual rate, u is the unemployment rate, ˙ m is the quarterly rate of growth
of the money supply at an annual rate, and D1 equals 1 for 1979:4–1982:3 and 0
otherwise. The results of estimating equation (1) for the 1954:1–2002:3 period are
presented in Table 1.3
The endogenous variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are inﬂation
and the unemployment rate, and two stage least squares was used to estimate the
equation. In the ﬁrst stage regressions inﬂation and the unemployment rate are
regressed on a set of predetermined variables (the main predetermined variables
in the U.S. subset of the MC model). The predicted values from these regressions
are then used in the second stage. One can look on the these regressions as those
used by the Fed to predict inﬂation and the unemployment rate, and so it need not
be assumed that the Fed has perfect foresight.
3NotethatthethreemonthTreasurybillrateisusedfortheinterestrate. Althoughinpracticethe
Fed controls the federal funds rate, the quarterly average of the federal funds rate and the quarterly
average of the three month Treasury bill rate are so highly correlated that it makes little difference
which rate is used in estimated interest rate rules using quarterly data. The money supply data are
taken from the ﬂow of funds accounts.
5Table 1
Estimated U.S. Interest Rate Rule
Dependent Variable is r
Coef. t-stat.
constant .748 4.90
˙ p .080 4.50
u -.113 -3.64
 u -.756 -5.65
˙ m−1 .011 1.88
D1 ×˙ m−1 .217 9.52
r−1 .909 46.16
 r−1 .225 3.97




Wald (p-value) 15.32 (.053)
Estimation period: 1954:1–2002:3 (195 obs.)
Estimation technique: two stage least squares
r = three month Treasury bill rate
˙ p = inﬂation rate
u = unemployment rate
˙ m = growth rate of the money supply
D1 = 1 for 1979:4–1982:3; 0 otherwise
Wald test: see text
Equation (1) is a “leaning against the wind” equation. r is estimated to depend
positively on the inﬂation rate and the lagged growth of the money supply and
negatively on the unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment rate.
Adjustment and smoothing effects are captured by the lagged values of r. The
coefﬁcient on lagged money supply growth is .228 (= .217 + .011) for the early
Volckerperiodcomparedtoonly.011beforeandafter, whichisconsistentwiththe
Fed’s stated policy of focusing more on monetary aggregates during this period.
This way of accounting for the Fed policy shift does not, of course, capture the
richness of the change in behavior, but at least it seems to capture some of the
6change.
The Wald test in Table 1 is of the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients in the rule
are the same before the early Volcker period as after (but not including the early
Volckerperiod). TheWaldstatisticisdistributedasχ2 with(inthiscase)8degrees
of freedom. The p-value is .053, and so the hypothesis of stability is not rejected
at the 5 percent level. Other tests of the equation, including other stability tests,
are reported in Fair (2001) for the sample period ending in 1999:3.
Assuming that in the long run ˙ m equals ˙ p, the long run coefﬁcient on inﬂation
in Table 1 is 1.0 [=(.080+.011)/(1 - .909)]. As noted in the Introduction, the other
three rules have imposed long run coefﬁcients of 0.0, 1.5, and 2.5 respectively.
This was done for each rule by changing the coefﬁcient for ˙ p in the estimated rule
in Table 1. The respective coefﬁcients are -.011, .1255, and .2165. None of the
other coefﬁcients in the estimated equation were changed for the three rules. This
process is similar to that followed for the studies in Taylor (1999), where the ﬁve
main rules tried had inﬂation coefﬁcients varying from 1.2 to 3.0. No inﬂation
coefﬁcient less than 1.0 was tried in these studies because the models, which are
modern-view models, are not stable in this case.
The MC model is a standard structural macroeconometric model in the Cowles
Commission tradition, where the structural equations are estimated by a consis-
tent technique (2SLS). When a coefﬁcient in the interest rate rule is changed, this
changes the reduced form of the model. If the model were linear, analytic expres-
sions for the reduced form equations could be derived, and one could see directly
how the reduced form coefﬁcients were changed. Since the model is nonlinear, no
analytic expressions are available, and the model must be solved by an iterative
7technique (in the present case, the Gauss-Seidel technique). It is still the case, of
course, that the reduced form is changed when the inﬂation coefﬁcient in the rule
is changed, and the solution accounts for this.
The Stochastic Simulation Procedure
The four interest rate rules are examined using stochastic simulation. The focus
in this paper, as in much of the literature, is on variances, not means. The aim of
monetary policy is taken to smooth the effects of shocks. In order to examine the
ability of monetary policy to do this, one needs an estimate of the likely shocks
that monetary policy would need to smooth, and this can be done by means of
stochastic simulation. Given an econometric model, shocks can be generated by
drawing errors.
There are 362 stochastic equations in the MC model, 191 quarterly and 171
annual. There is an estimated error term for each of these equations for each
period. Although the equations do not all have the same estimation period, the
period 1976–1998 is common to almost all equations.4 There are thus available
23 vectors of annual error terms and 92 vectors of quarterly error terms. These
vectors are taken as estimates of the economic shocks, and they are drawn in the
manner discussed below. Since these vectors are vectors of the historical shocks,
they pick up the historical correlations of the error terms. If, for example, shocks
in two consumption equations are highly positively correlated, the error terms in
the two equations will tend to be high together or low together.
4For the few equations whose estimation periods began later than 1976, zero errors were used
for the missing observations.
8The period used for the stabilization experiments is 1994:1–1998:4, ﬁve years
or 20 quarters. Since the concern here is with stabilization around base paths and
not with positions of the base paths themselves, it does not matter much which
path is chosen for the base path. The choice here is simply to take as the base path
the historical path. The base path is generated by adding the historical errors to the
equationsandtakingthemtobeexogenous. Thus,forallthestochasticsimulations
in this paper the historical errors are added to the model and the draws are around
these errors.
Each trial for the stochastic simulation is a dynamic deterministic simulation
for 1994:1–1998:4 using a particular draw of the error terms. For each of the ﬁve
yearsforagiventrialanintegerisdrawnbetween1and23withprobability1/23for
each integer. This draw determines which of the 23 vectors of annual error terms
is used for that year. The four vectors of quarterly error terms used are the four
that correspond to that year. Each trial is thus based on drawing ﬁve integers. The
solution of the model for this trial is an estimate of what the world economy would
have been like had the particular drawn error terms actually occurred. (Remember
thatthedrawnerrortermsareontopofthehistoricalerrortermsfor1994:1–1998:4,
which are always used.) The number of trials taken is 100, so 100 world economic
outcomes for 1994:1–1998:4 are available for analysis.5
5Another way of drawing error terms would be from an estimated distribution. Let ˆ V be an
estimate of the 362×362 covariance matrix V of the error terms. One could, for example, assume
that the error terms are multivariate normal and draw errors from the N( ˆ µt, ˆ V) distribution, where
ˆ µt is the vector of the historical errors for t. Because of the quarterly-annual difference, ˆ V would
have to be taken to be block diagonal, one quarterly block and one annual block. Even for this
matrix, however, there are not enough observations to estimate all the nonzero elements, and so
many other zero restrictions would have to be imposed. The advantage of drawing the historical
error vectors is that no distributional assumption has to be made and no zero restrictions have to be
9The historical errors are added to the interest rate rule, but no errors are drawn
for it. Adding the historical errors means that when the model inclusive of the rule
issolvedwithnoerrorsforanyequationdrawn,aperfecttrackingsolution results.6
Not drawing errors for the rule means that the Fed does not behave randomly but
simply follows the rule.
Let y
j
t be the predicted value of endogenous variable y for quarter t on trial j,
and let y∗
t be the base (actual) value. How best to summarize the 100 × 20 values
of y
j









t )2, where J is the total number of
trials.7 The problem with this measure, however, is that there are 20 values per


















L is a measure of the deviation of the variable from its base values over the whole
period.8
imposed.
6Each of the four rules used has a different set of historical errors associated with it because the
predicted values from the rules differ due to the different inﬂation coefﬁcients.
7Ify∗
t weretheestimatedmeanofyt, thismeasurewouldbetheestimatedvarianceofyt.G i v e n
the J values of y
j




t , and for a nonlinear model it is not
the case that this mean equals y∗
t even as J goes to inﬁnity. As an empirical matter, however, the
difference in these two values is quite small for almost all macroeconometric models, and so it is
approximately the case that the above measure of variability is the estimated variance.
8L is, of course, not an estimated variance. Aside from the fact that for a nonlinear model the
10The Results
The results for this section are presented in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows in Table 2. The
ﬁrst row (“No rule”) treats r as exogenous. This means that the value of r in a
givenquarteristhehistoricvalueforallthetrials: r doesnotrespondtotheshocks.
ValuesofLarepresentedforrealGDP(Y),theleveloftheprivatenonfarmdeﬂator
(P), the percentage change in P ( ˙ P), and r. The following discussion will focus
on Y, P, and r. The results for ˙ P are generally similar to those for P, although
the differences in L across rules are larger for P than for ˙ P. All the experiments
for the MC model use the same error draws. This considerably lessens stochastic
simulation error across experiments.
The results in Table 2 are easy to summarize. Consider row 1 versus row 3
ﬁrst. L for Y falls from 2.75 for the no rule case to 2.31 for the estimated rule,
and L for P falls from 3.07 to 2.40. Both output and price variability are thus
lowered considerably by the estimated rule. Now consider rows 2 through 5. As
the long run inﬂation coefﬁcient increases from 0.0 to 2.5, the variability of P
falls, the variability of r rises, and the variability of Y is little affected. The cost
of lowering P variability is thus an increase in r variability, not an increase in Y
variability. Which rule one thinks is best depends on the weights one attaches to
P and r variability,
mean of yt is not y∗
t , Lj is an average across a number of quarters or years, and variances are not
in general constant across time. L is just a summary measure of variability.
11Table 2
Variability Estimates: Values of L
MC Model
YP ˙ Pr
1. No rule (r exogenous) 2.75 3.07 2.00 0.00
2. Modiﬁed rule (0.0) 2.32 2.72 1.91 0.42
3. Estimated rule(1.0) 2.31 2.40 1.85 0.58
4. Modiﬁed rule (1.5) 2.32 2.27 1.82 0.73
5. Modiﬁed rule (2.5) 2.34 2.03 1.78 1.15
6. 3. with tax rule 2.01 2.28 1.82 0.52
US Model
7. No rule (r exogenous) 3.42 3.12 2.04 0.00
8. Estimated rule 2.94 2.60 1.94 0.55
9. Optimal (λ1 = 0.5,λ 2 = 0.5) 2.54 3.17 2.05 0.96
10. Optimal (λ1 = 0.5,λ 2 = 1.5) 2.67 2.83 1.97 0.78
11. Optimal (λ1 = 0.5,λ 2 = 2.5) 2.79 2.59 1.91 0.75
Y = real GDP
P = private nonfarm deﬂator
˙ P = percentage change in the private nonfarm deﬂator
r = three month Treasury bill rate
Simulation period = 1994:1–1998:4
Number of trials = 100
Estimated rule (1.0) = estimated rule, where long run
inﬂation coefﬁcient = 1.0
Modiﬁed rule (0.0) = estimated rule with long run
inﬂation coefﬁcient = 0.0
Modiﬁed rule (1.5) = estimated rule with long run
inﬂation coefﬁcient = 1.5
Modiﬁed rule (2.5) = estimated rule with long run
inﬂation coefﬁcient = 2.5
How do these results compare to those in the literature? Probably the largest
difference concerns row 2, where the variability in row 2 is less than the variability
in row 1. This shows that even the rule with a long run inﬂation coefﬁcient of zero
lowers variability. As discussed above, in modern-view models the rule in row 2
wouldbedestabilizing. Clarida,Galí,andGertler(2000)haveacleardiscussionof
this. They conclude that the rule used by the Fed in the pre-1979 period probably
12had an inﬂation coefﬁcient less than one (p. 177), and they leave as an open
question why the Fed followed a rule that was “clearly inferior” (p. 178) during
this period. The results in this paper suggest that such a rule is not necessarily bad.
Results regarding the tradeoff between output variability and price variability
as coefﬁcients in a rule change appear to be quite dependent on the model used.
This is evident in Tables 2 and 3 in Taylor (1999a, p. 43), and McCallum and
Nelson (1999) point out that increasing the inﬂation or output coefﬁcient in their
rule leads to a tradeoff in one of their models but a reduction in both output and
price variability in another. In this paper the tradeoff is between price variability
and interest rate variability as the inﬂation coefﬁcient is increased. There is little
tradeoff between output and price variability. Because the tradeoffs are so model
speciﬁc, one must have conﬁdence in the model used to have conﬁdence in the
tradeoff results. As discussed above, the MC model has been extensively tested
and appears to be a good approximation to the economy, and so the results in
Table 2 may be conveying useful information.
3 Optimal Control
The Procedure
Much of the literature on examining rules has not been concerned with deriving
rules by solving optimal control problems,9 but optimal control techniques are
obvious ones to use in this context. The following procedure has been applied
9Exceptions are Feldstein and Stock (1993), Fair and Howrey (1996), and Rudebusch (1999).
13to the U.S. subset of the MC model. This subset, which will be called the “US
model,” is discussed in the appendix.
The US model is completely quarterly, and quarterly historical errors for the
1976:1–1998:4 period (92 quarters) were used for the draws. Each vector of quar-
terly errors had a probability of 1/92 of being drawn. Not counting the estimated
interest rate rule, there are 29 estimated equations in the US model plus the export
(EX) and price of imports (PIM) equations discussed in the appendix.
The optimal control methodology requires that a loss function be postulated
for the Fed. In the loss function used here the Fed is assumed to care about output
about inﬂation deviations and about interest rate ﬂuctuations. In particular, the
loss for quarter t is assumed to be:
Ht = λ1100[(Y − Y∗)/Y∗]2 + λ2100( ˙ P − ˙ P∗)2 + α( rt −  r∗
t )2
+1.0/(rt − 0.999) + 1.0/(16.001 − rt)
(4)
whereY isrealGDP, ˙ P isthepercentagechangeintheprivatenonfarmdeﬂator,and
∗ denotes a base value. λ1 is the weight on output deviations, and λ2 is the weight
on inﬂation deviations. The last two terms in (4) insure that the optimal values of
r will be between 1.0 and 16.0. The value of α was chosen by experimentation to
yield an optimal solution with a value of L for r about the same as the value that
results when the estimated rule is used. The value chosen was 8.0.
Assume that the control period of interest is 1 through T, where in this paper 1
is 1994:1 and T is 1998:4. Although this is the control period of interest, in order
not to have to assume that life ends in T, the control problem should be thought
of as one of minimizing the expected value of
T+n
t=1 Ht, where n is chosen to be
large enough to avoid unusual end-of-horizon effects near T. The overall control
14problem should thus be thought of as choosing values of r that minimize the
expected value of
T+n
t=1 Ht subject to the model used.
Ifthemodelusedislinearandthelossfunctionquadratic,itispossibletoderive
analytically optimal feedback equations for the control variables.10 In general,
however, optimal feedback equations cannot be derived for nonlinear models or
for loss functions with nonlinear constraints on the instruments, and a numerical
procedure must be used. The following procedure was used for the results in this
paper. It is based on a sequence of solutions of deterministic control problems,
one sequence per trial.
Recall what a trial for the stochastic simulation is. A trial is a set of draws
of 20 vectors of error terms, one vector per quarter. Given this set, the model is
solved dynamically for the 20 quarters using an interest rate rule (or no rule). This
entire procedure is then repeated 100 times (the chosen number of trials), at which
time the summary statistics are computed. As will now be discussed, each trial for
the optimal control procedure requires that 20 deterministic control problems be
solved, and so with 100 trials, 2,000 solutions are required.
For purposes of solving the control problems, the Fed is assumed to know
the model (its structure and coefﬁcient estimates) and the exogenous variables,
both past and future. The Fed is assumed not to know the future values of any
endogenous variable or any error draw when solving the control problems.11 The
Fed is assumed to know the error draws for the ﬁrst quarter for each solution. This
10See, for example, Chow (1981).
11ThemainexogenousvariablesintheUSmodelareﬁscalpolicyvariables. Theotherexogenous
variables are either unimportant or easy to forecast. Remember that since the base is the perfect
tracking solution, the historical errors are always added to the model.
15is consistent with the use of the above rules, where the error draws for the quarter
are used when solving the model with the rule.
The procedure for solving the overall control problem is as follows.
1. Draw a vector of errors for quarter 1, and add these errors to the equations.
Take the errors for quarters 2 through k to be their historical values (no
draws), wherek isdeﬁnedshortly. Choosevaluesofr forquarters1through
k that minimize
k
t=1 Ht subject to the model as just described. This is just
a deterministic optimal control problem, which can be solved, for example,
by the method in Fair (1974).12 Let r∗
1 denote the optimal value of r for
quarter 1 that results from this solution. The value of k should be chosen to




Fed could have computed at the beginning of quarter 1 (assuming the model
and exogenous variables were known) having knowledge of the error draws
for quarter 1, but not for future quarters.
2. Record the solution values from the model for quarter 1 using r∗
1 and the
error draws. These solution values are what the model estimates would have
occurred in quarter 1 had the Fed chosen r∗
1 and had the error terms been as
drawn.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the control problem beginning in quarter 2, then for
the control problem beginning in quarter 3, and so on through the control
problem beginning in quarter T. For an arbitrary beginning quarter s, use
the solution values of all endogenous variables for quarters s − 1 and back,
as well as the values of r∗
s−1 and back.
4. Steps 1 through 3 constitute one trial, i.e., one set of T drawn vectors of
errors. Do these steps again for another set of T drawn vectors. Keep doing
this until the speciﬁed number of trials has been completed.
12This method sets up the problem as an unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem and uses
an optimization algorithm like DFP to ﬁnd the optimum. Almost all the computer time for the
overall procedure in this section is spent solving these optimization problems. The total computer
time taken to solve the 2,000 optimization problems was about 3 hours on a computer with a 1.7
GHz Pentium chip.
16The solution values of the endogenous variables carried along for a given trial
from quarter to quarter in the above procedure are estimates of what the economy
would have been like had the Fed chosen r∗
1,...,r∗
T and the error terms been as
drawn.13
By “optimal rule” in this paper is meant the entire procedure just discussed.
There is obviously no analytic rule computed, just a numerical value of r∗ for each
period.
The Results
The results are presented in rows 7–11 in Table 2. The experiments in these rows
use the same error draws to lessen stochastic simulation error across experiments,
although these error draws are different from those used for the experiments in
rows 1–6. Rows 7 and 8 are equivalent to rows 1 and 3: no rule and estimated rule,
respectively. The same pattern holds for both the MC model and the US model
results, namely that the estimated rule substantially lowers the variability of both
Y and P.
Row9presentstheresultsfortheoptimalsolutionwithequalweights(i.e.,λ1 =
0.5 and λ2 = 0.5) on output and inﬂation in the loss function. Comparing rows 7
and 9, the optimal control procedure lowered the variability of Y substantially and
13The optimal control procedure just outlined differs somewhat for the procedure used in Fair
and Howrey (1996, pp. 178-179). In Fair and Howrey (1996) the Fed is assumed not to know the
exogenous variable values, but instead to use estimated autoregressive equations to predict these
values for the current and future quarters. Also, the Fed is assumed not to know the error draws
for the current quarter when solving its problem. In addition, stochastic simulation is not done.
Instead, the error terms are set to zero (instead of to their historical values), the target values are
taken to be the historical means (instead of the actual values), and the (one) trial uses for the error
draws for a given quarter the actual errors for that quarter.
17had little effect on the variability of P. This is quite different than the estimated
rule(row8). TheestimatedruleloweredthevariabilityofbothY andP,butthefall
in the variability of Y was much less than it was for the optimal control procedure.
For rows 10 and 11 the weight on inﬂation in the loss function is increased.
This, not surprisingly, increases the variability of Y and lowers the variability of
P. Row 11, which has a weight of 2.5 on inﬂation, gives similar results to those in
row 8, which uses the estimated rule. In this sense the estimated rule is consistent
withtheFedminimizingthelossfunction(4)withweightsλ1 = 0.5andλ2 = 2.5.
Again, how do these results compare to those in the literature? A common
result in the Taylor (1999) volume is that simple rules perform nearly as well as
optimal rules or more complicated rules. See Taylor (1999a, p. 10), Rotemberg
andWoodford(1999,p. 109),RudebuschandSvensson(1999,p. 238),andLevin,
Wieland, andWilliams (1999, p. 294). The results in rows 8 and 11 are consistent
with this theme, where the estimated rule performs nearly as well as the optimal
control procedure. The optimal control procedure in this case is one in which
the Fed puts a considerably higher weight on inﬂation than on output in the loss
function.
184 Adding a Tax Rate Rule
Turning back to the MC model, it is clear in Table 2 that considerable overall
variability is left in rows 2–5. In this section a tax rate rule is analyzed to see how
much help it can be to monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. The idea is that
a particular tax rate or set of rates would be automatically adjusted each quarter as
a function of the state of the economy. Congress would vote on the parameters of
the tax rate rule as it was voting on the general budget plan, and the tax rate or set
of rates would then become an added automatic stabilizer.
Consider, for example, the federal gasoline tax rate. If the short run demand
for gasoline is fairly price inelastic, a change in the after-tax price at the pump will
have only a small effect on the number of gallons purchased. In this case a change
in the gasoline tax rate is like a change in after-tax income. Another possibility
would be a national sales tax if such a tax existed. If the sales tax were broad
enough, a change in the sales tax rate would also be like a change in after-tax
income.
For the results in this paper a constructed federal indirect business tax (IBT)
rate based on data from the national income and product accounts is used for the
tax rate rule. In practice a speciﬁc tax rate or rates, such as the gasoline tax rate,
would have to be used, and this would be decided by the political process. The
constructed tax rate for quarter t, denoted τt, is the ratio of overall federal indirect
business taxes to total consumption expenditures. In the regular version of the
model τt is taken to be exogenous.
19The following equation is used for the tax rate rule:
τt = τ∗
t + 0.125[.5((Yt−1 − Y∗
t−1)/Y∗
t−1) + .5((Yt−2 − Y∗
t−2)/Y∗
t−2)]
+0.125 ∗[ .5( ˙ Pt−1 − ˙ P∗
t−1) + .5( ˙ Pt−2 − ˙ P∗
t−2)]
(5)
where, as before, Y denotes real GDP and ˙ P denotes the percentage change in a
private nonfarm price deﬂator. It is not realistic to have tax rates respond contem-
poraneously to the economy, and so lags have been used in (5). Lags of both one
and two quarters have been used to smooth tax rate changes somewhat. The rule
says that the tax rate exceeds its base value as output and the inﬂation rate exceed
their base values. Note that unlike the basic interest rate rule used in this paper,
equation (5) is not based on an estimated rule. It would not make sense to try to
estimate such a rule since it is clear that the government has never followed a tax
rule policy.
Results using this rule along with the estimated interest rate rule are reported
in row 6 in Table 2. The use of the rule lowers L for Y from 2.31 when only the
estimatedinterestrateruleisusedto2.01whenbothrulesareused. Therespective
numbers for P are 2.40 and 2.28. The tax rate rule is thus of some help in lowering
output and price variability, with a little more effect on output variability than on
price variability. The variability of r falls slightly when the tax rate rule is added,
since there is less for monetary policy to do when ﬁscal policy is helping.
205 Conclusion
The main conclusions about monetary policy from the results in Table 2 are the
following:
1. TheestimatedruleexplainingFedbehavior(inTable1)substantiallyreduces
output and price variability (row 3 versus row 1).
2. Variability is reduced even when the long run coefﬁcient on inﬂation in the
interest rate rule is set to zero (row 2 versus row 1). This is contrary to
what would be the case in modern-view models, where such a rule would be
destabilizing.
3. Increasingthelongruncoefﬁcientoninﬂationintheinterestraterulelowers
price variability, but it comes at a cost of increased interest rate variability
(for example, row 5 versus row 3).
4. A tax rate rule is a noticeable help to monetary policy in its stabilization
effort (row 6 versus row 3).
5. The optimal control procedure with λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 2.5, which means a
higher weight on inﬂation than on output in the loss function, gives results
thataresimilartotheuseoftheestimatedrule(row11versusrow8). Thefact
that the estimated rule does about as well as the optimal control procedure
is consistent with many results in the literature, where simple rules tend to
do fairly well.
6. Evenwhenboththeestimatedinterestrateruleandthetaxrateruleareused,
the values of L in Table 2 are not close to zero (row 6). Monetary policy
even with the help of a ﬁscal policy rule does not come close to eliminating
the effects of typical historical shocks.
21Appendix
The MC Model
An updated version of the MC model in Fair (1994) has been used for the present
work. This version is presented on the website mentioned in the introductory
footnote. There are 38 countries in the MC model for which stochastic equations
are estimated.14 There are 31 stochastic equations for the United States and up to
15 each for the other countries. The total number of stochastic equations is 362,
and the total number of estimated coefﬁcients is 1649. In addition, there are 1111
estimated trade share equations. The total number of endogenous and exogenous
variables, not counting the trade shares, is about 5000. Trade share data were
collected for 59 countries, and so the trade share matrix is 59 × 59.15
The estimation periods begin in 1954 for the United States and as soon after
1960 as data permit for the other countries. They end between 1998 and 2002.
The estimation technique is two stage least squares except when there are too
few observations to make the technique practical, where ordinary least squares is
used. Theestimationaccountsforpossibleserialcorrelationoftheerrorterms. The
variablesusedfortheﬁrststageregressorsforacountryarethemainpredetermined
variables in the model for the country. A list of these variables is available from
14The 38 countries are the United States, Canada, Japan, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, South Africa, Korea, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Colombia, Jordan, Syria, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, China,
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
15The 21 other countries that ﬁll out the trade share matrix are Brazil, Turkey, Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, Nigeria, Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, the UnitedArab Emirates, and an all other category.
22the website.16
There is a mixture of quarterly and annual data in the MC model. Quarterly
equations are estimated for 14 countries (the ﬁrst 14 in footnote 19), and annual
equationsareestimatedfortheremaining24. However,allthetradeshareequations
are quarterly. There are quarterly data on all the variables that feed into the trade
share equations, namely the exchange rate, the local currency price of exports, and
the total value of imports per country. When the model is solved, the predicted
annual values of these variables for the annual countries are converted to predicted
quarterly values using a simple distribution assumption. The quarterly predicted
valuesfromthetradeshareequationsareconvertedtoannualvaluesbysummation
or averaging when this is needed.
Two properties of the model will be outlined here. The ﬁrst is the effect of
inﬂation shocks on the economy with the nominal interest rate held constant, and
the second is the effect of nominal interest rates on the economy.
Inﬂation Shock with Nominal Interest Rate Constant
A positive inﬂation shock with the nominal interest rate held constant is contrac-
tionary in the United States in the MC model. The three main reasons are:
1. Thewagerateappearsinthepriceequationandthepricelevelappearsinthe
wage rate equation, and these two equations have the feature that a positive
price shock leads to an initial fall in the real wage rate. In other words,
wage rates lag prices. Real wage income thus falls because of the fall in the
16Some of the equations in the model are changed beginning in 1999 to incorporate the EMU.
Beginning in 1999, the exchange rate equations of the individual EMU countries are replaced with
one exchange rate equation, and the individual interest rate rules are replaced with one rule. These
changes are not relevant for this paper because the simulation period ends in 1998.
23real wage rate. This has a negative effect on real household expenditures
because real income is an explanatory variable in the household expenditure
equations.
2. Real wealth is an explanatory variable in the consumer expenditure equa-
tions. Much of this wealth is held in the form of corporate stocks. The
response of nominal stock prices in the model to an increase in the price
level is fairly modest, and it is the case that a positive price shock leads to a
fall in real wealth. In other words, nominal wealth lags prices. The fall in
real wealth then has a negative effect on real consumer expenditures.
3. Empirical results from estimating the household expenditure equations sug-
gest that households respond to nominal interest rates and not real interest
rates, and so nominal interest rates are used as explanatory variables in these
equations. There is thus no estimated positive household response to lower
real interest rates when there is a positive inﬂation shock with nominal in-
terest rates held constant.
This property of the model is discussed in more detail in Fair (2002). In this paper
an experiment was performed in which there was a positive shock to the price
equation with the nominal interest rate held constant, and this led to a decrease in
real GDP—Fair (2002, Table 3).
Nominal Interest Rate Changes
TheU.S.shorttermnominalinterestrateinthemodel(r),whichisthethree-month
Treasury bill rate, affects the economy in a number of ways:
1. Long term interest rates depend on current and lagged values of r.
2. An interest rate appears as an explanatory variable in each of the household
expenditure equations (three consumption and one housing investment) and
the plant and equipment investment equation, all with negative coefﬁcient
estimates.
243. An interest rate has a negative effect on capital gains (CG)i nt h eCGequa-
tion, and changes in CGchange household wealth. Household wealth is an
explanatory variable in the consumption and housing investment equations
with positive coefﬁcient estimates.
4. Interest payments of ﬁrms and the government—and thus interest income
of households—change when interest rates change, and household interest
incomeappearsinthehouseholdexpenditureequationsthroughadisposable
income variable, which has a positive effect in these equations.
5. A change in r leads to a change in the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the other
major currencies through exchange rate equations—an increase in r leads
to an appreciation of the dollar and a decrease leads to a depreciation. A
change in the value of the dollar leads to a change in U.S. import prices,
which then results in a change U.S. domestic prices through an import price
variableinthedomesticpriceequation. Thechangeinthevalueofthedollar
also leads to a change in the demand for U.S. exports through the trade share
equations, and it leads to a change in U.S. import demand through an import
price variable in the U.S. import equation.
6. r appears as an explanatory variable in some of the other countries’interest
rate rules, and so foreign interest rates in part follow U.S. rates.
Theneteffectsof,say,adecreaseinr onU.S.outputandthepricelevelarepositive.
Output increases because there is an increase in the demand for U.S. domestically
produced goods, and the price level increases because of the increase in demand
and the depreciation of the dollar.
The US Model
The optimal control procedure is too costly in terms of computer time to be able
to be used for the MC model, and for this work the U.S. subset of the model was
used. The “US model” used for the optimal control results is exactly the same
25as the model for the United States in the MC model except for the treatment of
U.S. exports (EX) and the U.S. price of imports (PIM). These two variables
change when r changes—primarily because the value of the dollar changes—and
the effects of r on EX and PIMwere approximated in the following way.
First, logEXt − α1rt was regressed on a constant, t, logEXt−1, logEXt−2,
logEXt−3, and logEXt−4, and logPIM t − α2rt was regressed on a constant,
t, logPIMt−1, logPIM t−2, logPIM t−3, and logPIM t−4. Second, these two
equations were added to the US model for particular values of α1 and α2, and
an experiment was run in which the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed was
dropped and r was decreased by one percentage point. This was done many times
for different values of α1 and α2. The ﬁnal values of α1 and α2 chosen were
ones whose experimental results most closely matched the results for the same
experiment using the complete MC model. The ﬁnal values chosen were -.0004
and -.0007 respectively. Third, the experiment in the third row of Table 2 was run
for the US model with the EX and PIMequations added and with the estimated
errors from these equations being used in the drawing of the errors. When an error
for the EXequation was drawn, it was multiplied by β1, and when an error for the
PIMequation was drawn, it was multiplied by β2. The experiment was run many
times for different values of β1 and β2, and the ﬁnal values chosen were ones that
led to results similar to those in the third row of Table 2. The values were β1 = .4
and β2 = .75. The results using these values are in row 8 of Table 2. The chosen
values of α1, α2, β1, and β2 were then used for the experiments in rows 7–11.
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